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ABSTRACT: In this paper the strategic use of innovation by two polluting firms to influence environ-
mental policy is evaluated. The analysis is carried out by comparing two alternative policy regimes for 
two policy instruments: Taxes and standards. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits 
to an ex-ante level of the policy instrument. In the second one, there is no commitment. The results show 
that when there is no commitment and a tax is used to control emissions, the strategic behavior of firms 
can be welfare improving if the efficiency of the clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, 
the strategic behavior of the duopolists has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless of the policy instru-
ment used to control emissions.
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La elección del momento oportuno de la política ambiental 
en un mercado duopolístico
RESUMEN: En este trabajo se evalúa el uso estratégico de la innovación por dos empresas con-
taminantes para influir en la política ambiental. El análisis se desarrolla comparando dos regímenes de 
política alternativos para dos instrumentos: impuestos y estándares. El primero de los regímenes supone 
que el regulador se compromete con un nivel ex-ante del instrumento de política. En el segundo, no hay 
compromiso. Los resultados muestran que cuando no hay compromiso y se utiliza un impuesto para con-
trolar las emisiones, el comportamiento estratégico de las empresas mejora el bienestar si la eficiencia de 
las tecnologías limpias es relativamente baja. Si este no es el caso, el comportamiento estratégico de los 
duopolistas tiene un efecto perjudicial sobre el bienestar independientemente del instrumento de política 
utilizado para controlar las emisiones.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Compromiso, duopolio, estándares, impuestos, innovación.
JEL classification: H23, L13, L51, Q55.
DOI: 10.7201/earn.2015.01.02.
12  R. Moner-Colonques and S.J. Rubio
1. Introduction
It is well understood by now that the ability of a government or regulator to 
commit to a particular policy in a credible manner has significant consequences for 
various aspects of economic activity. In the context of environmental regulation in 
imperfectly competitive markets, if the regulator cannot commit to the stringency 
of the policy instrument, firms have lower incentives to innovate because the regu-
lator has an ex-post possibility to ratchet up regulation and expropriate gains from 
investment in clean technologies. In anticipation of expropriation, firms may reduce 
their innovation effort. On the other hand, if the regulator is not able to commit, 
firms may also strategically use innovation to ratchet down regulation and increase 
profits as noted by Gersbach and Glazer (1999). Besides, oligopoly firms care about 
their competitive position against rivals. For instance, if a firm increases innovation 
to obtain a reduction of the emission tax from the regulator, it will have to consider 
that such tax reduction will induce rivals to increase production and, therefore, that 
the increase in innovation will finally lead to a price lower than expected by the in-
crease of its own production. In other words, the increase in innovation will have a 
negative effect on the firm’s marginal revenue because its rival will raise production 
to adjust to a lower tax. These strategic considerations are present in many sectors 
such as the automobile industry and agriculture, where the introduction and adoption 
of new technologies has become a key feature. For instance, modern biotechnology 
provides breakthrough products and technologies that improve crop herbicide tole-
rance, ultimately increasing crop yields. In 2014, the global area of biotech crops 
reached 181.5 million hectares and their global market value was US$15.7 billion 
(James, 2014). These figures show the importance of an industry where the top three 
seed firms (Monsanto, Dupont and Syngenta) control almost 50 % of all seeds, and 
each spends more than US$1.5 billion in R&D. There are many genetically modified 
(GM) products ready to be commercialized yet they require approval of regulatory 
agencies. These are concerned with the possible toxicity of GM food and products, 
as well as about environmental risks such as the impact of gene flow, the evolution 
of pest resistance and loss of biodiversity. Whether there is consumer resistance to 
GM products depends on the message perceived about their quality. In many coun-
tries it is mandatory to label products that use GM ingredients as these products must 
comply with certain standards. In the end, the regulatory regime that should govern 
the industry is the outcome of competition and bargaining between pressure groups, 
legislators and the bureaucracy1.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of the timing of environmental 
policy on environmental innovation and welfare in imperfectly competitive markets. 
This issue can conveniently be addressed in a model that features a polluting duopoly 
1 The reader might like to see Bonroy and Constantatos (2015) for an excellent survey on the implications of 
labels both from a theoretical and a policy perspective. In particular, these authors identify that regulators must 
consider the distortions associated with market structure, the label’s standard and lobbying activities in favor of, 
or opposed to the imposition of the label. To illustrate, Monsanto spent more than US$6 billion lobbying in 2012 
in an effort to convince lawmakers not to label GM products (October 2013, Nation of Change Journal).
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where firms can invest in clean technology. Such investments reduce emissions yet 
they are costly. On the other hand, a regulatory agency cares about environmental 
damages and may use environmental policy instruments to reduce emissions. The 
analysis considers two policy instruments, emission taxes and emission standards, 
and distinguishes whether the regulator has the ability to commit or not. Under 
commitment the regulator can credibly choose the emission tax or standard before 
firms decide on innovation effort. When the regulator’s policy is non-credible, firms 
anticipate that they can use innovation to influence the regulator’s choice of the time-
consistent (or ex-post) emission tax or standard.
Our findings show that the regulator’s inability to commit to an emission standard 
level not only yields a lower level of environmental innovation relative to the com-
mitment case but also generates less welfare, i.e. the strategic behavior of firms has 
a detrimental effect on social welfare. If the regulator cannot commit, firms reduce 
innovation to prompt a larger standard. Firms use innovation to ratchet down regu-
lation. Production can be larger or lower in the no commitment case but welfare is 
in any case lower. Without commitment, what happens when a standard is used to 
control pollution is that the increase in environmental damages because of a larger 
standard and the reduction in consumer surplus when production is lower more than 
compensates the reduction in investment costs. Instead, when the production is lar-
ger, the reduction in investment costs and the increase in consumer surplus are more 
than compensated by the increase in environmental damages. However, if a tax is the 
policy instrument selected to address pollution, the strategic behavior of firms may 
be welfare improving. If the regulator cannot commit, firms increase innovation to 
induce the regulator to set up a lower tax. Firms use innovation to ratchet down re-
gulation but now the result may be an increase both in profits and welfare. This will 
occur when the convexity of investment costs is relatively more important than that 
of environmental damages, i.e. when the efficiency of the clean technology is low in 
relative terms. Then, the reduction in the tax induced by the strategic behavior of the 
firms comes along with an increase in environmental innovation that mitigates the 
increment in emissions caused by a larger production. The result is that the increase 
in consumer surplus because of a larger production more than compensates the incre-
ment in investment costs and environmental damages leading to higher welfare. The 
increase in production also yields larger profits. In this case, the regulator’s inability 
to commit to environmental policy is not a problem. However, if environmental 
damages are severe, i.e. if the efficiency of the clean technology is high in relative 
terms, the ordering between the different variables is reversed and the strategic be-
havior of firms has a detrimental effect on social welfare when a tax is used. Sum-
marizing, commitment is better than no commitment for large enough environmental 
damages and the choice of the instrument is not an issue because with commitment 
both instruments are equivalent. Finally, we compare welfare for both instruments 
when the regulator is not able to commit and we show that for a large constellation 
of parameter values, the optimal policy is to apply a tax on emissions although firms 
would prefer a standard. Only when environmental damages are severe, the regulator 
should implement a standard although in this case firms would prefer a tax.
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A lot of papers have studied the extent to which an environmental policy provides 
firms with incentives to invest in environmental innovation under imperfect compe-
tition. An excellent survey to consult is Requate (2006). The majority of them assu-
mes that the regulator is able to commit and moves first in the policy game. See for 
instance the papers by Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995; 1996), Damania (1996), 
Carlsson (2000), Innes and Bial (2002), Antelo and Loureiro (2009), Coria (2009) 
and more recently by McDonald and Poyago-Theotoky (2014). On the other hand, the 
list of papers where the regulator is not able to commit is rather short including the 
contributions by Poyago-Theotoky (2007; 2010) and more recently by Ouchida and 
Goto (2014)2. Other papers, such as those by Chiou and Hu (2001), Montero (2002), 
Gil-Moltó and Varvarigos (2013) assume that either the level of the policy instrument 
or the target of the environmental policy are exogenously given. Finally, there are 
only a few papers directly addressing the research question studied in this paper: Pe-
trakis and Xepapadeas (1999; 2001; 2003); Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak 
(2002), Puller (2006) and more recently Moner-Coloques and Rubio (2014)3.
In Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999; 2003) and in the first part of Petrakis and Xe-
papadeas (2001) the case of a polluting monopoly is studied when the regulator uses a 
tax to control emissions. Their analyses show that if marginal damages are increasing 
then the strategic behavior of the monopolist is welfare improving. Welfare is always 
larger when the regulator is not able to commit to the emission tax rate. Moreover, 
they obtain this result for two different specifications of the emission function, one 
that is additively separable in output and innovation and another for which emissions 
are proportional to output. Moner-Colonques and Rubio (2014) clarify that the for-
mer results depend on the policy instrument used by the regulator as well as on the 
nature of the damage function. They show that with constant marginal damages, the 
strategic behavior of the monopolist has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless 
of the instrument used by the regulator. Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001) also study 
the case of a polluting oligopoly and illustrate that the monopoly results extend to 
the small numbers oligopoly, but they are reversed for the large numbers oligopoly 
case. Competition plays for regulatory commitment. Our analysis gives support to 
this result and clarifies that with some competition, i.e. with two firms, the strategic 
behavior of firms has a detrimental effect on welfare provided that environmental 
damages are large enough. Moreover, our research also highlights the importance of 
the policy instrument, a point not dealt with by these authors. Puller (2006) investi-
gates the effects of regulation through performance standards for a Cournot duopoly 
with spillovers. In his model, the reduction of the performance standard increases 
the marginal cost of production but investment can mitigate this effect. He finds 
that competition in the output market creates incentives to raise rivals’ costs, which 
2 Ulph and Ulph (2013) study optimal climate change policies when governments cannot commit but they ab-
stract from any competition issues arising from the potential exercise of monopoly power by the single firm that 
is regulated by the government.
3 Jakob and Brunner (2014) analyze the optimal type and degree of commitment to a future climate policy when 
damages from climate change are uncertain. However, as Ulph and Ulph (2013), they abstract from any competi-
tion issues between polluting firms.
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induces firms to innovate into compliance cost technology. Therefore, the incentive 
to influence the performance standard depends on the relative size of the ratchet and 
raise rivals cost effects. Using numerical exercises he concludes that the raise rivals 
cost effect relies on the innovator’s ability to appropriate the majority of the benefits 
of innovation efforts. This suggests that the lack of regulatory commitment in an 
oligopoly setting can reduce welfare in the absence of strong intellectual property 
rights. Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002) examine a Cournot differen-
tiated duopoly to show that the effects of an emission tax on innovation and welfare 
depends on the degree of product differentiation. Our results support those obtained 
by these authors for a low degree of product differentiation. 
Another strand of the literature has investigated the interplay between environ-
mental policy, the incentives to adopt new technology, and repercussions on R&D 
in a setting where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced 
abatement technology to polluting downstream firms that could sell their output in 
a competitive market. See, among others, the contributions by Laffont and Tirole 
(1996), Denicolò (1999), Requate (2005), Montero (2011) and more recently Wirl 
(2014)4. All these papers highlight the importance of commitment versus no com-
mitment of environmental policy on the incentives to make investments in R&D to 
reduce pollution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Section 3 analyzes the strategic use of innovation to influence an emission standard 
and Section 4 to influence an emission tax. Section 5 summarizes the results of wel-
fare comparisons and derives policy recommendations and Section 6 offers some 
concluding remarks and points out lines for future research.
2. The model
We consider a model where two firms produce a homogeneous good under 
a linear demand specification , where . The 
marginal cost of production is assumed constant and equal to c for both firms, with 
a > c > 0. Following Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001); Poyago-Theotoky (2007) 
and Ulph (1996), after an appropriate choice of measurement units such that each 
unit of output generates one unit of pollution, we express firm i’s (net) emissions as 
 where wi stands for environmental innovation
5. The investment 
in abatement technology, wi commonly referred to as end-of-pipe pollution invest-
ment for this specification of the emission function, is costly. Investment costs are 
given by  which captures that there exist decreasing returns 
4 David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) extend the analysis assuming that abatement technologies are provided 
by an imperfectly competitive eco-industry.
5 The particular choice for the specification of the pollution generation process is made for the sake of the 
presentation. We conjecture that for a non-linear emissions function we would obtain the same qualitative re-
sults. For instance, as was pointed out in the Introduction, Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003) show that the results 
derived for a polluting monopoly with a linear specification of the emissions function (like the one used in this 
paper) turn out to be robust under a non-linear specification.
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in innovation effort, with the parameter γ  measuring the extent of such decreasing 
returns or the inverse of the efficiency of the emission-reducing technology. Finally, 
pollution generates environmental damages. The damage function is assumed to be 
quadratic in (net) emissions as follows:  where d > 0 captures how 
important marginal damages are and E=ei + ej.To guarantee an interior solution for 
innovation and a positive emission tax, we will assume d ≥ 1.5 in what follows.
We shall consider two alternative policy regimes, each featuring a multi-stage 
game of complete and perfect information between a welfare maximizing regulator 
and two profit maximizing firms, to examine the properties and desirability of having 
either a committed or non-committed regulator regarding environmental policy. To 
be more precise, in the first regime, which will be labelled as the committed (or ex-
ante) regulator game, the regulator sets the level of an environmental policy instru-
ment, then the duopolists, taking that level as given, choose investment in abatement 
technology simultaneously and independently. In the second regime, the non-com-
mitted (or ex-post) regulator game, firms first select its environmental innovation le-
vel, simultaneously and independently, then the regulator sets the level of the policy 
instrument. The analysis will distinguish two instruments: a per unit tax on emissions 
and a standard. When the regulator chooses an emission tax, the two policy games 
have three-stages. In both games, the firms select output in the third stage. However, 
when the regulator chooses a standard, the two policy games only have two stages 
provided that output, according to the emission function, is determined once the 
regulator has chosen the standard and the firms have chosen the innovation. The solu-
tion concept employed is subgame perfection. One could extend the model to include 
private information, but this simple game shows that the lack of commitment can 
have relevant welfare consequences even without private information6.
3. Emission standard
We shall begin by considering an emission standard , sometimes referred to as 
command and control policy. We first analyze the policy game where the regulator 
moves first.
3.1. The committed regulator game
Under emission standards regulation,  where  is the emission stan-
dard imposed on the firms. Then in the second stage, the firms choose innovation 
effort to maximize profits taking as given the emission standards
6 A paper where this isue is studied is Antelo and Lourerio (2009). These authors examine the effects of signaling 
on environmental taxation in a two-period oligopoly model in which each firm privately knows whether its technol-
ogy is clean or dirty while third parties have only a subjective perception about this fact.
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Solving for wi in the first-order condition yields
Using these first-order conditions we obtain the equilibrium level of environmental 
innovation per firm 
[1]
where A = a - c, with A being a measure of market size. Notice that there is an inverse 
relation between wi and the standards and so the firm reduces innovation when the 
regulator increases the emission standards; the standard that is imposed on firm i has 
a stronger effect. The resulting level of production is the following:
An increase in firm i’s emission standard leads it to choose a larger production 
level but the effect is the contrary if the regulator increases the standard of the rival. 
Adding for the output of the firms we obtain total output as follows:
[2]
where  . Observe that total output does not depend on the allocation of 
standards between the firms but on the total standard.
In the first stage, the regulator chooses the emission standard taking into account 
how the firms are going to respond. The regulator maximizes welfare, which is defi-
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where  is given by [2] and  by [1]. This maximization yields the fo-
llowing condition
where the first term on the left-hand side measures the increase in consumer sur-
plus coming from the increase in market output when the regulator raises the 
amount of standards. The second term stands for the decrease in investment costs, 
internalizing how individual standard affects own and rival’s innovation, that is, 
 and  On the right-hand side, we find the 
increase in environmental damages coming from a raise in standards.
It is easy to show that the optimization problem [3] has a symmetric solution 
given by
[4]
where superscript c is used to denote the commitment case and subscript s stands for 
emission standards. It is straightforward that the emission standard decreases with 
environmental damages. Then we can calculate the equilibrium innovation and pro-
duction levels, which are given by
[5]
[6]
Since we have assumed that d ≥ 1.5 the innovation level is positive. Finally, equi-
librium profits and welfare are provided below:
[7]
[8]
This completes the analysis of this policy game.
,
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3.2. The non-committed regulator game
In this subsection we solve for the two stage game where the firms plays before 
the regulator does. When there is no commitment, in the second stage, the regulator 
chooses the emission standards that maximizes welfare taking as given the firms’ 
innovation effort. Welfare is defined as above and is given by
and the first-order conditions are
but since the two firms have the same constant marginal costs, the previous condi-
tions only determine the total amount of standards
[9]
There is an inverse relation between firms’ investments and the total standard, that 
is, the regulator increases the emission standards in response to a reduction in the 
firms’ innovation levels. This means that firms can strategically use their choice of 
innovation to influence the standards: by decreasing investment in emission-reducing 
activities the firms can expect a larger emission standard. Of course, this strategic as-
pect is missing in the case of commitment to the environmental policy studied above.
In the first stage, firms choose their innovation efforts taking into account how 
the regulator is going to respond to it. However, this stage cannot be solved without 
defining first an allocation rule of the standards between firms. Given that firms are 




where  and  are given by [10]. The maximization problem 
yields the following condition:
,
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where the left-hand side represents the marginal revenue of the firm and the right-
hand side includes the marginal production and investment costs. The strategic effect, 
 reduces the impact that an increase of innovation has on production. The 
second term on the left-hand side stands for a cross strategic effect between firms 
that appears because when firm i increases its investment, given the allocation rule 
defined above, the regulator is going to reduce the standards for both firms. This has 
a positive effect on the marginal revenue of firm i because, ceteris paribus, its rival in 
the market reduces production to adjust to a lower standard which moves outwards 
the marginal revenue curve of firm i.
Solving the previous condition by assuming a symmetric equilibrium we obtain 
the optimal innovation effort
[11]
We employ superscript nc to denote the equilibrium in the no commitment game. 
Then we can substitute for the equilibrium values of emission standard and produc-
tion levels, which are given by
[12]
[13]
Finally, equilibrium profits and welfare are:
[14]
[15]
This completes the analysis of the non-committed regulator game.
,
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3.3. Comparing policy games
In this section we draw comparisons between the committed and non-committed 
regulator games. Subtracting [4] from [12] we obtain the difference between the 
equilibrium emission standards as follows:
and using [5] and [11] the expression 
shows the difference in innovation efforts.
Thus, the following proposition can be established:
Proposition 1. The optimal commitment emission standard is lower than the optimal 
no commitment emission standard, i.e. . However, the optimal commitment 
environmental innovation is larger than the optimal no commitment environmental 
innovation, i.e., .
So when the government selects its policy after firms’ decisions on environmental 
innovation, firms have a strategic incentive to lower its innovation effort in order to 
induce larger emission standards. In this sense the firms enjoy a first-mover advan-
tage in influencing the environmental policy through its choice of innovation. This 
strategic effect disappears when the government can commit to a specific emission 
standard in advance. Consequently, the optimal commitment emission standard is 
lower than the optimal no commitment emission standard and innovation is larger. 
Therefore, the regulator’s ability to commit to an emission standard promotes envi-
ronmental innovation relative to the no commitment case.
Since q = e + w it is unclear what happens to production. Making use of [6] and 
[13] we obtain the following expression:
This difference in production is zero for all combinations ),( dγ  that satisfy
[16]
Analyzing this equation it can be concluded that
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Proposition 2. For all  the optimal commitment production is lower than 
the optimal no commitment production, i.e., . However, for all d > 3 there 
exists a decreasing function  with  defined by the positive 
root of equation [16]such that for all  the optimal commitment production 
is lower than the optimal no commitment production, i.e.  but if  the 
contrary occurs, i.e. .
In Fig. 1 we represent the contour defined by [16] that divides the (g, d) space 
in two regions. If for any d > 3 we have that  then the optimal commitment 
production is larger than the optimal no commitment production (region above the 
contour). Otherwise, the contrary occurs (region below the contour). The above result 
discloses that when d and g are sufficiently large the increase in environmental inno-
vation when the regulator commits dominates the reduction in the emission standard 
yielding an increase in production.
FIGURE 1 
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Finally, we compare duopoly profits and welfare under commitment and no com-
mitment environmental policies. The welfare comparison is particularly important 
because it establishes potential gains in welfare from choosing a certain policy re-
gime. The comparison yields the following result:
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Proposition 3. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists a decreasing function  with 
, whose value for d = 1.5 is equal to 0.6062 such that if  
the optimal commitment profits are larger than the optimal no commitment profits, 
i.e.  but if  the contrary occurs, i.e.  However, the optimal 
commitment welfare is larger than the optimal no commitment welfare, i.e.  
regardless of the value of g.
Proof. See Annex A.
Notice that the relationship between welfare for the two policy games is unequi-
vocal and does not depend on the ordering of the equilibrium production levels. 
Welfare is larger when there is commitment regardless of whether the production is 
larger or lower. With commitment, when a standard is used to control pollution the 
reduction in environmental damages because of a lower standard more than compen-
sates the increase in investment costs and the reduction in consumer surplus when 
production is lower. Instead, when the production is larger, the increase in investment 
costs is more than compensated by the reduction in environmental damages plus the 
increment in consumer surplus.
Firms can certainly take advantage of their earlier choice when the regulator 
is unable to commit to a specific emission standard. Under this lack of regulatory 
commitment, the duopolists can increase their profits by appropriately choosing their 
innovation effort. However, this is not possible if the efficiency of the emission-
reducing technology is large enough (low decreasing returns). In this case, with low 
enough investment costs the reduction in revenues because of a larger production is 
not compensated by the reduction in investment costs yielding lower profits.
In Fig. 2 we represent the contour that divides the (g, d) space in two regions 
such that the optimal commitment profits are lower than the optimal no commitment 
profits (region above the contour) when . Otherwise, the contrary occurs 
(region below the contour). A necessary condition to get that the strategic behavior 
of firms leads to lower profits is 6062.0<γ  what implies according to Prop. 2 that 
. Nevertheless, Fig. 2 shows that for a large constellation of parameter values 
we have to expect that the optimal commitment profits are lower than the optimal no 
commitment profits.
Summarizing, the regulator’s ability to commit to an emission standard not only 
promotes environmental innovation relative to the no commitment case but also 
yields a larger welfare. Commitment dominates no commitment from a social point 
of view when the instrument of the environmental policy is an emission standard.
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FIGURE 2 
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4. Emission tax
We now examine whether the strategic use of innovation can be welfare impro-
ving when the regulator selects an emission tax to control pollution. When the policy 
instrument is a tax the game has three stages. In the first stage, the regulator sets up 
the emission tax, then the duopolists choose their investments in innovation, simulta-
neously and independently, conditional on the emission tax and, finally, they decide 
their outputs which yield the level of emissions.
4.1. The committed regulator game
In the third stage, firms choose the profit maximizing outputs
taking as given the emission tax rate, t. The first-order condition yields
Using these first-order conditions we calculate the (subgame perfect) equilibrium 
level of production per firm and total output
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[17]
Notice that a firm’s production decreases in the emission tax.
In the second stage, firms choose innovation, wi, to maximize profits
where  is given by [17]. The first-order conditions yield
[18]
that defines a positive relationship between innovation and the emission tax. Now 
using [17] and [18], total emissions can be calculated giving the following expression
[19]
In the first stage, the regulator selects the emission tax to maximize welfare taking 
into account how firms are going to respond to it
[20]
where Q(t) is given by [17], w(t) by [18] and E(t) by [19]. This maximization pro-
blem yields the following condition
[21]
where the left-hand side measures the marginal benefit of taxation that is given by the 
reduction in environmental damages associated to an increase in the emission tax rate 
and the right-hand side the marginal cost of taxation that has two components: the 
decrease in consumer surplus coming from the fall in output market and the raise in 
investment costs both caused by an increase in the emission tax rate.
This condition yields the optimal emission tax, which is given by 
[22]
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Using [22] we can calculate the equilibrium values for the remaining variables. 
Since the two firms face the same emission tax, both firms will select the same levels 
of production and innovation, and both firms will pollute by the same amount. Then 
we check that all variables take the same values than for the committed regulator 
game when a standard is used to control emissions. This allows us to conclude the 
following result:
Proposition 4. If the regulator is able to commit to its environmental policy the two 
instruments are equivalent in the sense that they yield the same equilibrium outcome.
Profits are identical before taxation and they could be identical after taxation too 
in case the regulator reimbursed the tax revenues using, in the Pigouvian tradition, a 
lump-sum subsidy that in practice could be implemented for example as an exemp-
tion in corporate rates.
4.2. The non-committed regulator game
The last stage is the same as in the previous subsection. In the second stage, the 
regulator chooses the welfare maximizing emission tax taking as given the innova-
tion levels. Welfare can be written as follows:
where Q(t) is given by [17]. The first-order condition yields
[23]
This expression defines an inverse relationship between firms’ investments and the 
emission tax, that is, the regulator decreases the emission tax rate in response to an 
increase in the firms’ innovation levels. Thus, firms can strategically use its choice 
of innovation to influence taxation: by increasing investment in emission-reducing 
activities the firms can expect a lower emission tax.
In the first stage, firms choose their innovation efforts taking into account how the 
regulator is going to respond. Firms solve the following optimization problem:
where t(wi + wj) is given by [23] and firms’ output by [17]. The first-order condition 
can be written as follows:
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Taking into account that, in the third stage, marginal revenue is equal to marginal 
cost plus the emission tax it can be rewritten as
[24]
This condition states that the gross reduction in fiscal expenses because of an 
increment in investment must be equal to the increase in investment costs plus 
the fall in marginal revenue coming from a cross strategic effect between firms, 
 that appears because when firm i increases its investment, the 
regulator is going to reduce the emission tax for both firms. This has a negative effect 
on the marginal revenue of firm i because its rival raises production to adjust to a 
lower tax which moves inwards the marginal revenue curve of firm i.
From these conditions, we obtain the reaction functions in (wi , wj) space
Since the slope of the reaction functions is negative, innovation efforts are strategic 
substitutes. This is in contrast to the commitment case where  Solving 
the previous system of reaction functions by assuming a symmetric equilibrium we 
derive the optimal innovation effort7
[25]
Then we can substitute for the equilibrium values of the emission tax and outputs, 
which are given by
[26]
[27]
7 Subscript t stands for emission tax.
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Equilibrium emissions are equal to the difference between production and inno-
vation, that is,
[28]
Finally, equilibrium profits before taxation and welfare are given by
[29]
[30]
which completes the analysis of this policy game.
4.3. Comparing policy games
In this subsection we compare the two policy games we have just analyzed. Subtrac-
ting [5] from [25] we obtain the difference between the equilibrium investment levels
This difference is zero for all combinations (g, d) that satisfy
[31]
Using this equation the following result can be derived:
Proposition 5. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists an increasing function  defined by 
the positive root of equation [31] such that for all  the optimal commitment 
environmental innovation is larger than the optimal no commitment environmental 
innovation, i.e.  but if  the contrary occurs, i.e. 
In Fig. 3 the contour defined by [31] that divides the (g, d) space in two regions 
is drawn. Above the curve, the optimal commitment innovation is lower than the op-
timal no commitment innovation. However, the contrary occurs in the region below 
the curve. Above the curve, the efficiency of the emission-reducing technology is 
low enough in relative terms, or in other words, the ratio g/d is large. In this case, the 
committed regulator, according to [21], will select a low tax because it is expensive to 
reduce pollution what will induce firms not to invest a lot. Observe that the regulator 
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takes into account the increase in investment costs supported by the two firms. Howe-
ver, when there is no commitment each firm only takes into account its own inves-
tment costs, see condition [24], what will lead them to invest more in these circums-
tances. Matters change when the ratio g/d is low. With large environmental damages 
in relative terms, the regulator will select a high tax because the reduction in pollution 
brings a substantial reduction in environmental damages. This incentive is absent in 
the no commitment case and firms will invest less than in the commitment case.
FIGURE 3 

















Next we compare the equilibrium emission taxes using [22] and [26]:
This difference is zero for all combinations (g, d) that satisfy
[32]
Studying this equation and taking into account that from [17]
it can be concluded that
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Proposition 6. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists an increasing function  defined by 
the positive root of equation [32] such that for all  the optimal commitment 
emission tax is lower than the optimal no commitment emission tax and the optimal 
commitment production is larger than the optimal no commitment production, i.e. 
tc < tnc and  but if  the contrary occurs, i.e. tnc < tc and  
This result complements the previous one although to find an optimal com-
mitment emission tax lower than the optimal no commitment emission tax it is neces-
sary to have a low ratio g/d. See Fig. 4. Notice that although a committed regulator 
selects a lower tax rate when g/d is high than when this ratio is low, as the firms are 
investing more when g/d is high finally the non-committed regulator will set up a 
tax lower than in the commitment case. This result is a consequence of the influence 
firms have on taxation when the regulator is not able to commit.
FIGURE 4 

















Next, we calculate the difference in emissions using [6] and [28]
Then, the following result can be established:
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Proposition 7. The optimal commitment emissions are lower than the optimal no 
commitment emissions, i.e.  
Observe that regardless of the policy instrument used by the regulator to control 
pollution, emissions are always lower when the regulator is able to commit. Thus, 
we can conclude that the strategic behavior of firms to influence the environmental 
policy always leads to larger emissions.
Finally, we compare the firms’ profits and the welfare. The following proposition 
summarizes the results of the comparison.
Proposition 8. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists an increasing function  whose value 
for d = 1.5 is equal to 1.7677 such that if  the optimal commitment welfare 
is larger than the optimal no commitment welfare, i.e.  but if  the 
contrary occurs, i.e.  However, the optimal commitment profits are lower 
than the optimal no commitment profits, i.e.  regardless of the value of g.
Proof. See Annex A.
When an emission tax is used to control pollution, the relationship between wel-
fare for the two policy games depends on the ratio g/d as is shown in Fig. 5. Welfare 
can be larger when there is no commitment if the efficiency of the emission-reducing 
technology is relatively low, or in other words, if the ratio g/d is large, in particular for 
all combinations (g, d) in the region above the contour  represented in Fig. 5.
FIGURE 5 
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In this case, the increase in investment costs and environmental damages is more 
than compensated by the raise in consumer surplus. Firms bear a lower emission 
tax and produce more if there is a lack of regulatory commitment. This increase in 
production yields a larger welfare level. Under these circumstances, the strategic be-
havior of firms is welfare improving and can induce more environmental innovation 
than under regulatory commitment. On the other hand, profits before taxation are 
always lower under regulatory commitment. The duopolists can increase their profits 
by appropriately choosing its innovation effort if the regulator is unable to commit 
to a specific emission tax rate regardless of the efficiency of the emission-reducing 
technology. Thus, when the ratio g/d is large the strategic behavior of firms impro-
ves both welfare and profits. However, when the ratio g/d is low, i.e. environmental 
damages are high in relative terms, the strategic behavior of firms is detrimental for 
welfare and firms get more profits influencing the environmental policy but at the 
cost of reducing social welfare.
5. Taxes versus standards
Next, we use the results obtained in the previous sections to rank welfare levels. 
We have already established the equivalence between the instruments when the regu-
lator can credibly commit to its environmental policy.
A first result that is straightforward to establish by using Propositions 3 and 8 is:
Corollary 1. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists an increasing function  whose value 
for d = 1.5 is equal to 1.7677 such that if  the optimal commitment welfare 
is larger than the optimal no commitment welfare regardless of the policy instrument 
used to control pollution. However, if γ >  the highest welfare is achieved when 
the regulator is not able to commit, and uses a tax on emissions whereas the lowest 
welfare is achieved when it uses an emission standard. When the regulator is able to 
commit, the welfare is between these two extreme values, i.e.  
This result says us that, if the efficiency of the emission-reducing technology is 
low enough in relative terms, the inability of the regulator to commit to environmen-
tal policy is not a problem provided that a tax is used to control emissions. The use 
of a tax when the regulator is unable to commit yields the maximum welfare. Thus, 
if the ratio g/d is large, the optimal environmental policy is to announce a tax rate 
and to update it once the firms have undertaken their investments. However, if the 
environmental problem is serious the ratio g/d is low and then the optimal policy is 
commitment regardless of the policy instrument since a tax and a standard are equi-
valent in welfare terms. In this case, the inability of the regulator to commit has a 
social cost.
In order to find the policy instrument that minimizes this cost, we compare wel-
fare for both instruments when the regulator is not able to commit obtaining the 
following result.
The timing of environmental policy in a duopolistic market 33
Proposition 9. For all d ≥ 1.5 there exists an increasing function  whose value 
for d = 1.5 is equal to 0.9750 such that if  the optimal no commitment wel-
fare when the regulator uses a tax is lower than the optimal no commitment welfare 
when it applies a standard but profits are larger, i.e.  and Howe-
ver, if  the contrary occurs, i.e.  and  
 
Proof. See Annex A.
Again the sign of the comparison depends on the ratio g/d Fig. 6 shows the 
function  implicitly defined by the condition  In the region above 
the curve, the optimal no commitment welfare when the regulator uses a tax is larger 
than the optimal no commitment welfare when it applies a standard and the contrary 
occurs for the profits.
FIGURE 6 

















The figure shows that for a large constellation of parameter values the optimal po-
licy when the regulator is not able to commit is to apply a tax on emissions although 
firms would prefer a standard. Only when environmental damages are severe, the 
regulator should implement a standard although in this case firms would prefer a tax.
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6. Conclusions
This paper has examined the effects that the strategic use of environmental in-
novation has on environmental policy and its welfare implications in a duopoly. 
Specifically, it has been shown that the possibility that strategic behavior is welfare 
improving depends on the policy instrument and the severity of environmental dama-
ges. To evaluate the strategic behavior of firms, we compare two alternative policy 
regimes. The first of the regimes assumes that the regulator commits to an ex-ante 
level of the policy instrument and later the duopolists choose their environmental 
innovation effort, simultaneously and independently. The second one is the time 
consistent policy regime where the regulator sets the ex-post optimal level of the ins-
trument once the firms have chosen their innovation level. We have considered two 
instruments, a tax and a standard.
We have shown that the strategic behavior of firms is welfare improving and may 
induce more environmental innovation than under regulatory commitment only when 
a tax is used to control pollution and the convexity of investment costs is relatively 
more important than that of environmental damages, i.e. when the efficiency of the 
clean technology is relatively low. If this is not the case, the strategic behavior of 
firms has a detrimental effect on welfare regardless of the policy instrument used to 
control emissions. We also find that under regulatory commitment both policy instru-
ments are equivalent in the sense that they yield the same outcome.
These findings have implications for the design of environmental policy to re-
gulate the emissions of a duopoly. If the environmental damages are large enough, 
commitment is better than no commitment and the choice of the instrument is not 
a relevant issue because both policy instruments are equivalent but if the regulator 
is not able to commit a standard should be implemented. Otherwise, a tax yields 
larger welfare.
A limitation of our analysis is that we have assumed the simplest form of the 
emission function i.e. one that is additively separable in production and innovation. 
We conjecture that, based on the analysis by Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1999; 2003), 
our results could be extended to consider that innovation can reduce the emission/
production coefficient, which is an area for future research. Moreover, such an exten-
sion would allow us to consider another instrument: a performance standard regula-
ting the unit emissions coefficient. Another interesting extension would be to analyze 
the strategic use of innovation to influence the environmental policy when damages 
are uncertain and also when the abatement technology is subject to stochastic inno-
vation or this is private information. To be sure, our analysis is that it is static when 
in some cases environmental damages are caused by the accumulation of emissions. 
The study of the issue would require a dynamic approach. To conclude these words 
on the limitations and possible extensions of the paper, we may add that we have 
adopted a partial equilibrium approach so that more informed policy prescriptions 
would call for a general equilibrium perspective.
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Annex A
Proof of Proposition 3:
Using [8] and [15] we get:
where
It is easy to check that all these coefficients are positive for d ≥ 1.5 that yields 
 
Next, using [7] and [14] we obtain the difference in profits
[33]
where
All these coefficients are positive for g < 0.3229 what implies that  in 
this case. Moreover, it is easy to check that for all g > 0 there is only one change 
in the signs of the coefficients of polynomial form of d in the numerator of [33] so 
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that according Descartes’ rule of signs, the polynomial can have only a positive real 
root. In fact, as f5(g) is positive and f0 (g) is negative for g > 0.3229 there will exist for 
each value of g one and only one positive real root for d. The set of these solutions 
for  where 0.6062 is the value of g that corresponds to d = 1.5 
is plotted in Fig. 2. In other words, we plot in the (d,g) space the implicit function 
 given by
Finally, it is easy to check numerically that the difference in profits is negative in 
the region above the contour  
Proof of Proposition 7




Moreover, it is easy to check that for all d ≥ 1.5 there is only one change in the 
signs of the coefficients of polynomial form of g in the numerator of [34] so that ac-
cording Descartes› rule of signs, the polynomial can have only a positive real root. 
In fact, as g3(d) is positive and g0(d) is negative, there will exist for each value of d 
one and only one positive real root for g. The set of these solutions for  is 
plotted in Fig. 5 with g = 1.7677 for d = 1.5. In other words, we plot in the (g, d) space 
the implicit function  defined by
Finally, it is easy to check numerically that the difference in welfare is negative in 
the region above the contour  
Next, using [7] and [29] we calculate the difference in profits
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where
It is easy to check that all these coefficients are negative for d ≥ 1.5 that yields 
 
Proof of Proposition 9




There is only one change in the signs of the coefficients of polynomial form of g 
in the numerator of [35] for all d ≥ 1.5 so that according Descartes’ rule of signs, the 
polynomial can have only a positive real root. In fact, as i3(d) is negative and i0(d) is 
positive, there will exist for each value of d one and only one positive real root for 
g. The set of these solutions for  is plotted in Fig. 6 with g = 0.9750 for 
d = 1.5. In other words, we plot in the (g, d) space the implicit function  
defined by
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Finally, it is easy to check numerically that the difference in welfare is positive in 
the region above the contour  




Again the coefficients of polynomial form of g in the numerator of [36] only 
change their sign once for all d ≥ 1.5 so that according Descartes’ rule of signs, the 
polynomial can have only a positive real root. In fact, as j3(d) is positive and j0(d) is 
negative, there will exist for each value of d one and only one positive real root for 
g. When the set of these solutions for  is plotted in a graph, the resulting 
curve coincides with the one represented in Fig. 6 with g = 0.9750 for d = 1.5. In 
other words, the implicit function  coincides with the implicit function 
 for g, d > 0. Finally, it is easy to check numerically that the difference in 
profits is negative in the region above the contour .
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